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Newsflash | Selection Patents

 

November 7, 2008  - Selection Patents: Alive and Well in Canada


The Supreme Court of Canada released its long awaited decision in Apotex Inc. v. Sanofi‑Synthelabo Canada Inc., 2008 SCC 61 that will transform and harmonize Canadian patent law with decisions in the United Kingdom and United States.  This case required the Court to determine whether selection patents are invalid in principle or on the facts of this case on the grounds of anticipation, obviousness and double patenting

Background
Generally, a selection patent is a subsequently filed patent based on a selection of compounds from those described in general terms and claimed in an originating patent.  A selection patent claims a substantial advantage to be secured or disadvantage to be avoided by the use of the selected members in respect of a quality of a special character peculiar to the selected group.

Sanofi was the holder of the ‘875 patent which discloses a large genus or class of over 250,000 possible compounds useful in inhibiting platelet aggregation activity in the blood.  Sanofi also held the subsequent ‘777 patent which disclosed and claimed clopidogrel bisulphate, which was marketed under the trade name of Plavix as an anti‑coagulant that exhibits platelet aggregation inhibiting activity.   Apotex sought to market its generic version of Plavix, claiming that it would not infringe Sanofi's patent for Plavix because the ‘777 patent was invalid on the grounds of anticipation, obviousness and double patenting.

Anticipation
The Court held that under Canadian law a system of genus and selection patents is acceptable in principle and does not necessarily involve anticipation and therefore invalidity.  Previously, anticipation was based on a determining whether the invention in a patent had been disclosed in a single prior publication or patent.  The Court relaxed this requirement and adopted the approach set out in the UK decision in Synthon B.V. v. SmithKline Beecham plc, [2006] 1 All E.R. 685, [2005] UKHL 59.  Under this approach,
a two‑step approach should be adopted whereby the requirements of“prior disclosure”and“enablement”should be considered separately and proven.  For prior disclosure, the genus patent must disclose subject matter which, if performed, would necessarily result in infringement of that patent.  At this stage, the person skilled in the art is reading the prior patent to understand whether it discloses the special advantages of the second invention.  No trial and error is permitted. If in reading the genus patent, there is no discovery of the special advantages of the selection patent, the genus patent does not anticipate the selection patent and the disclosure requirement to prove anticipation, as in this case, fails. 

For "enablement", the person skilled in the art must have been able to perform the invention without undue burden.  The question at this stage of the test is how much trial and error or experimentation is permitted.  If an inventive step were required to get to the invention of the second patent, the specification of the first patent would not have provided enabling disclosure.  The entire prior genus patent must provide enough information to allow a person skilled in the art to perform or make the selected subsequently claimed invention without“undue burden".  The skilled person may use his or her common general knowledge of the relevant art at the relevant time to supplement information contained in the prior genus patent and may conduct routine trials without being considered an undue burden, but prolonged or arduous trial and error experiments would not be considered routine. 

Obviousness
With respect to obviousness, the Court also relaxed the rigid test for obviousness which required a determination of whether a
technician skilled in the art but having no scintilla of inventiveness or imagination; a paragon of deduction and dexterity, wholly devoid of intuition; a triumph of the left hemisphere over the right, would, in the light of the state of the art and of common general knowledge as at the claimed date of invention, have come directly and without difficulty to the solution taught by the patent.  This previous test did not accommodate a “worth a try” test by the skilled person.

The Court considered the tests set out by the UK and US courts in Generics (UK) Ltd. v. H. Lundbeck A/S, [2008] R.P.C. 19, and KSR International Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 127 S. Ct. 1727 (2007), respectively, and concluded that an “obvious to try” test can be relevant in an obviousness inquiry.  The Court adopted and re-stated the new approach to be followed from the decision in Windsurfing International Inc. v. Tabur Marine (Great Britain) Ltd., [1985] R.P.C. 59 (C.A.), and Pozzoli SPA v. BDMO SA, [2007] F.S.R. 37, [2007] EWCA Civ 588, as follows:

(1)        (a) Identify the notional “person skilled in the art”;
            (b) Identify the relevant common general knowledge of that person;

(2)       Identify the inventive concept of the claim in question or if that cannot readily be done, construe it;

(3)        Identify what, if any, differences exist between the matter cited as forming part of the“state  of the art”and the inventive concept of the claim or the claim as construed;

(4)       Viewed without any knowledge of the alleged invention as claimed, do those differences constitute steps which would have been obvious to the person skilled in the art or do they require any degree of invention?

The issue of “obvious to try” will arise at the fourth step of the inquiry.  For a finding that an invention was “obvious to try”, there must be evidence to convince a judge on a balance of probabilities that it was more or less self‑evident to try to obtain the invention.  Mere possibility that something might turn up is not enough. 

In the case at bar, the Court concluded that the selection patent was not anticipated because there was no evidence that a person skilled in the art would know, from reading the original patent, the specific beneficial properties associated with the more active dextro‑rotatory isomer and that it would be less toxic than the racemate or levo‑rotatory isomer or any of the other compounds made and tested.  Further, the selection patent was not obvious since there there were five well‑known methods to separate this racemate into its isomers, there was no evidence that a person skilled in the art would have known which of the five known separation techniques would work with this racemate.   Moreover, Sanofi had spent millions of dollars and several years developing the racemate up to the point of preliminary human clinic trials before it was discovered that the dextro‑rotatory isomer was active and non‑toxic.

Double Patenting  
Finally, the challenge to selection patents based on the ground of double patenting was also rejected.  The Court stated that strategies that attempt to extend the time limit of exclusivity of a patent may be contrary to the objectives of the Patent Act, depending on the circumstances, but a generalized concern about evergreening is not a justification for an attack on the doctrine of selection patents.  Further, selection patents encourage improvements over the subject matter of the original genus patent because that selection does something better than or different from what was claimed in the genus patent. 
 

Conclusions
The comments by the Court reflect a significant change in Canadian patent law from a rigid to a more flexible approach that reflects developments in the UK and the USA.  First, while the Court has relaxed the criteria for assessing anticipation and obviousness, it has confirmed that a system of genus and selection patents is acceptable.  Second, the Court has also confirmed that evergreening and strategies that attempt to extend the time limit of exclusivity of a patent is permissible and proper so long as anticipation and obviousness issues are addressed.  The Court acknowledged and accepted that selection patents encourage improvements over the subject matter of the original genus patent because that selection does something better than or different from what was claimed in the genus patent.  In this regard, the degree of time and investment expended by a patentee to demonstrate an advantage of particular compounds over the compounds claimed in the genus patent are likely to lead to an inference that the prior art and common general knowledge of persons skilled in the art was not sufficient to render the selection patent obvious.  This conclusion will favour patentees who are concerned about their ability to obtain patent protection of the results following significant expenditure of time and investment.

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